During the winter months of 1916 Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Head of the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command, was convinced that the Italian army was not strong enough to be able to breach the Isonzo line. He therefore started to think about an offensive on the Trentino-Veneto front that could have led to extraordinary results: in case of success, the army of Cadorna would have no other choice but to withdraw towards the Padua-Venezia line and in this way move the front westward by several kilometres.
Strongly convinced about this project, the Austro-Hungarian general sought the collaboration of the German forces but the discussion with his counterpart, Erich von Falkenhayn, was not successful. Germany (not formally at war with the Kingdom of Italy) was preparing a strong offensive at Verdun (February 1916) against France. From the German point of view, however, this plan had several problems starting with the number of divisions that were envisaged to attain this objective (too few) since this was considered inadequate. Supporting this initiative would only have made sense if it meant the total defeat of Italy. A simple withdrawal of the front was not considered so important.
This refusal did not discourage Conrad who still decided to go ahead with his plan, comforted by the recent successes on the eastern front and, perhaps, driven by his well-known distrust of Italy. He informed Archduke Eugene and General Borojevic of his plan and 160,000 men armed with some 1000 pieces of artillery reached the region between Val d'Adige and Valsugana in March.
The attack, initially earmarked for 10th April, had to be postponed, however, because of weather conditions. The heavy snowfalls in March rendered many streets inaccessible and many Alpine peaks that the Kaiserjäger should have conquered were unreachable. The day that had been fixed for this important battle was therefore postponed to mid-May hoping to find the Italian army still unprepared.
On his part Cadorna did not realize what was about to happen. Firmly convinced that Austria-Hungary would conduct a defensive war, he gave no attention to the information by General Roberto Brusati of the First Army (who was considered very irritable and an alarmist) and to information that was given by Austro-Hungarian spies and deserters. The continuous requests for reinforcements by Brusati became so unbearable that Cadorna asked Vittorio Emanuele III with a letter sent on 08th May to remove Brusati from his role.
The King accepted Cadorna's request and recalled Guglielmo Pecori Giraldi, an old general who had been asked to retire after a defeat during the Libyan occupation (1911). A few days later, on 15th May 1916, the first cannon shots proved Brusati right: the Habsburg Empire launched its great offensive that was dubbed as the Strafexpedition by an Austrian journalist or rather "the punitive expedition" against the Italian traitors.
