With the arrival of autumn Luigi Cadorna was convinced that there would be no other operations on the front of the Isonzo in 1917 with the exception of small skirmishes. Any new initiative would be postponed till the arrival of springtime in 1918 when an attempt would be made, following several other earlier attempts, to break through the zone of Mount Ermada to be able finally to enter Trieste.
This conviction was so strong that Italian officers underestimated the reports by Austro-Hungarian deserters that referred to a heavy concentration of men and weapons in the area between Plezzo and Tolmino. Never having organized an offensive on the Isonzo, it was somewhat absurd to think that this could take place with winter just round the corner.
Actually at first Cadorna believed these reports and on 18th September he wrote to all the commanders in the army and to the Minister for War. The general told them about the huge presence on the front near the Isonzo and went on to urge them "to give up the offensive operations that had been planned and to concentrate all their activities on preparations for an all-out defence." (Nicola Labanca, Caporetto - Storia di una disfatta, Guinti, Florence, 1997, page 31). Nevertheless, successive communications made no further reference to this situation and the Chief of the Italian Supreme Command himself moved on the Trentino front.
This underestimation by the Italian military leaders turned out to be a glaring mistake. Up to that moment Italian tactics had never been based on defence and the structures seemed weak in many areas. Furthermore General Capello, hardly receptive both to the idea of being on the defensive as well as to the implementation of orders issued by Cadorna, exhorted his men never to forget "the counter offensive spirit" and repeatedly asked for new reserves to surprise the Austro-Hungarians with an attack that would be launched in mid-October. These requests for new troops were turned down and the commander of the Second Army only agreed with the requests by Cadorna on 23rd October.
The lighthearted manner with which the orders issued on 18th September were taken and the total lack of interest in information that was passed by deserters combined to create an ideal situation for an attack by the Austro-Germans. Even in the face of warnings and obvious evidence, greater attention was given to false information that was received by means of radio communications that were intercepted by the Italians, to troop movements in Trentino and to the optimism of Cadorna himself who was sure that no attack would be launched before winter in the next year.
