On the dawn of 24th October 1917 Luigi Cadorna, in the headquarters of the Supreme Command at Udine, was informed of the heavy bombardment on the line Plezzo-Tolmino. True to his convictions, the general considered this as a hoax to detract attention from the front on the Karst.
At the same time on Mount Krasij, north of Caporetto, there was a third defensive line that consisted of several Alpine battalions including that commanded by the volunteerinterventionist Carlo Emilio Gadda. Together with his men he was awakened at two in the morning by the massive bombardments that continued till dawn. However, since they were not under attack and had received no order, they remained in their positions, isolated and completely surrounded by mist. At about noon they saw some Italian soldiers who were being followed by Austro-German troops and at 3.00 pm they heard explosions on the bridges on the Isonzo. They realized that they had been blocked and awaited in a resigned mood the attack by the enemy.
The first orders arrived after twenty-four hours when the Supreme Command was informed that Caporetto had fallen and that Austro-German troops had advanced to Saga and on the Kolovrat. It was decided to abandon all positions on the left bank of the Isonzo. Gadda therefore began to descend down the ridge. In a few minutes he realized that the situation was indeed very desperate: thousands of Italian soldiers were trying to cross the river (without any bridges) while the German troops were following them on both banks. Many of them decided to lay down their arms, surrender and be captured by the men led by Krauss.
In the meantime Rommel and his group of soldiers from Württenberg continued their advance on the Kolovrat and arrived easily up to the area around Mount Matajur, the highest peak in the Natisone Valleys. The next day other action to circumvent the enemy led to the capture of thousands of Italian soldiers who surrendered without putting up a fight and at noon on 26th October 1917 the Germans conquered the mountain. In only two days they had advanced 18 kilometres and captured 150 officers and 9,000 soldiers and had only lost 39 men.
By now the situation was precipitating swiftly even at the political level: in Rome Prime Minister Paolo Boselli resigned after losing a vote of confidence. A few hours later news started going round of what was happening in the Upper Isonzo. The Second Army was completely abandoned by its own officers and thousands of soldiers headed towards the Friuli Plain without any leadership. Many of them threw down their arms with a sigh of relief because they were convinced that the war had ended. At the same time the streets were full of soldiers in full retreat who were joined by the first civilians from Friuli who were forced to abandon their own homes by the Austro-German advance.
On 26th October Cadorna tried to hide the truth to the country with optimistic news bulletins but by now things were clear: the action that was carried out between Plezzo and Tolmino by Austro-German troops had led to a rout on the Italian front. The same leaders, despite obvious weaknesses and errors, rushed into "a frantic race to shake off from their backs every responsibility for the debacle […] and so keep intact their prestige and honour." (Ernesto Ragionieri, Lo Stato Liberale in Storia d'Italia Vol. 11, Einaudi, Turin, 2005, page 2034). According to them, the fault should be attributed to the air of resignation to defeat that was prevalent within the Kingdom.
Two days later a new bulletin, as usual signed by Cadorna, spread throughout the whole of Italy: "The lack of resistance by divisions of the Second Army who, in a vile manner, retreated without fighting or who shamefully surrendered to the enemy, allowed the armed Austro-German forces to break the left flank of our front in Giulia." (Nicola Labanca, Caporetto - Storia di una disfatta, Giunti, Florence, 1997, page 38). These grave accusations definitely marked the end of his career as the leader of the Italian army.
