When fighting began, Cadorna had under his command some 400,000 soldiers in the plains of Veneto and Friuli. Besides the First Army which had largely defensive duties, the other armies and the Zona Carnia already had received orders to advance beyond the border.
The Austro-Hungarian army could rely instead only on 50/70,000 soldiers, that went up to 110,000 during the next weeks. Its troops reflected the heterogeneous nature of the empire where only one-fourth could speak German and included among their ranks even 2% who were Italians. But these differences were overcome by a strong anti-Italian sentiment (especially among the Austrians and the Slavs) as was pointed out by the German Field Marshal Hindenburg: "[the Habsburg troops] fought against the Russians with their heads but attacked the Italians with all their heart."(Mark Thompson, La Guerra Bianca, Il Saggiatore, Milan, page 93).
In the zone of Medio and Basso Isonzo, the initial objective was to isolateGorizia and to reach Monfalcone in the south and the basin of Caporetto in the north. Although the Austro-Hungarian army left several kilometres without any resistance and placed its defenses on the first elevations, the Italian troops advanced with a lot of prudence. They crossed the border at Cervignano del Friuli and took two days to reach the right bank of Isonzo which was impossible to cross because of heavy rains. After the night of 04th June, the troops were again slowed by the marshes that had been prepared by the Austrians who in the meantime had organized their own defence on the Karst behind Monfalcone, which the Italians reached on 09th June.
While the Messina Battalion entered this port, further north the Second Army launched its first attack on Mount Calvario, on the outskirts of Gorizia. All the hills that surround this city on the river Isonzo had already been prepared for its defence and so this action failed. Instead in the Natisone Valleys the inexperience and the lack of preparations led to several rather simple mistakes: on reaching Caporetto on 25th May, the military commanders decided to conquer the mountains Nero and Mrzli so as to surround the village of Tolmino from the north. For some unknown reason, however, the advance was stopped towards the end of May and it was only on 16th June that the 3rd Reggimento Alpini conquered Mount Nero.
From this it was obvious that what should have been a war based on an offensive strategy revealed itself instead as a hazardous and badly organized advance. The poor quality of the equipment and of communications between divisions was already giving rise to problems. Besides, the morale of the troops already began to sway from the first moments when they found out that the population of Friuli and of the Isonzo region had welcomed their arrival with a lot of suspicion (although propaganda had convinced them of the contrary). In the first month Italy lost about 15,000 men and already on 10th June 1915 Cadorna informed his family (and also Salandra at a later stage) that even on the Italian front a battle based on trench warfare was looming that would not be concluded in a short time.
